This paper modifies Jaynes's axioms of plausible reasoning and derives the minimum relative entropy principle, Bayes's rule, as well as maximum likelihood from first principles. The new axioms, which I call the Optimum Information Principle, is applicable whenever the decision maker is given the data and the relevant background information. These axioms provide an answer to the question "why maximize entropy when faced with incomplete information?"
Introduction
Bayesian inference [1] and the maximum entropy principle (MaxEnt) of Jaynes [9] are valid methods of inference when the decision maker is faced with incomplete information. Although these methodologies are quite distinct, they often give similar results. A few authors have hinted at the possibility of deriving both methods from first principles. For instance, as the sample size increases, [23] showed that the distribution of a random variable conditional on empirical moment constraints (computed by Bayes's rule) converges to the minimum relative entropy distribution subject to the same population moment constraints. Conversely, [24] showed that Bayes's rule can be derived from a variational principle of information processing.
One possibility of deriving both the maximum entropy principle and Bayes's rule is to axiomatize plausible reasoning, as [14, 13, 3, 12] attempted. In the most primitive form, Jaynes [12] suggested desiderata that should be employed in plausible reasoning, by which he deduced Bayes's rule. To apply Bayes's rule we have to start from some priors, and Jaynes advocates the use of the maximum entropy principle to set up priors. However, there are many situations in which both MaxEnt and Bayesian inference are applicable. Which method should we take then? And do they return the same result? In this paper I propose a different set of axioms of plausible reasoning, by which I derive the minimum relative entropy principle 1 , Bayes's rule, and maximum likelihood.
I proceed in two steps. First, I list the desiderata of a measure of information gain when a decision maker updates the plausibility of a proposition upon receiving new information. From these desiderata I derive the functional form of information gain. Second, I impose the decision maker to be maximally conservative, given all the relevant information. That is, the decision maker updates the plausibilities by minimizing the average information gain (i.e., sticks to his or her prior as much as possible) subject to all relevant information, which I call the Optimum Information Principle. I show that the Optimum Information Principle implies the well-known minimum relative entropy principle, the Bayes rule, and also Jaynes's axioms.
Axioms of Plausible Reasoning
Viewing probability as the plausibility of a proposition dates back at least to Keynes [14] . As Cox [3] describes it "as if Euclid had placed the Pythagorean theorem among the axioms of plane geometry", Keynes's axioms were not fundamental, and have been improved by [13] and [3] . To date the most primitive axioms of plausible reasoning seem to be those of Jaynes [12, pp. 17-19 (a) If a conclusion can be reasoned out in more than one way, then every possible way must lead to the same result.
(b) The robot 2 always takes into account all of the evidence it has relevant to a question. It does not arbitrarily ignore some of the information, basing its conclusions only on what remains. In other words, the robot is completely nonideological.
(c) The robot always represents equivalent states of knowledge by equivalent plausibility assignments. That is, if in two problems the robot's state of knowledge is the same (except perhaps for the labeling of the propositions), then it must assign the same plausibilities in both.
Desideratum II means the following. If we denote the plausibility of a proposition A given information I by p(A|I), then
, and (2.1)
In words, (2.1) says that if information C gets updated to C ′ in such a way that the plausibility of A is increased, then the plausibility of the negation of A is decreased; (2.2) says that if, in addition, the plausibility of B given A is unchanged, then the plausibility that both A and B are true must increase.
Chapter 2 of [12] shows that desiderata I-IIIb imply that plausibilities have a probability representation and they obey Bayes's rule, and that desideratum IIIc implies Laplace's Principle of Indifference [17] for setting up priors.
In order to derive MaxEnt and Bayes's rule, I first axiomatize the quantity which I call information gain and derive its functional form. The axioms, which are all intuitively appealing, are as follows.
IG-1. Numerical representation: the information gain I is a function of prior plausibility p and posterior plausibility q.
IG-2. Smootheness and monotonicity: the information gain is a smooth, increasing function in posterior plausibility.
IG-3. Path independence: the total information gain of updating the prior plausibility p to the posterior q is independent of the path it is updated. That is, if there are two paths p → r → q and p → r ′ → q, then I(p, r) + I(r, q) = I(p, r ′ ) + I(r ′ , q).
IG-4.
Independence from the choice of unit: whatever unit we choose to describe plausibility, the information gain should have the same value. That is, I(tp, tq) = I(p, q) for t > 0.
IG-5. Zero information gain for not updating: for any p, we have I(p, p) = 0.
Proposition 1. Suppose that axioms IG-1-IG-5 hold. Then
Proof. Since by axiom IG-2 the information gain I(p, q) is smooth in q, it is partially differentiable with respect to q and I can be recovered by integrating its partial derivative. Differentiating I(p, r) + I(r, q) = I(p, r ′ ) + I(r ′ , q) with respect to q, we get
The left-hand side of (2.3) is a function of (r, q), and the right-hand side of (2.3) is a function of (r ′ , q). Since r, r ′ are arbitrary, (2.3) must be a function of only q. Let ∂I ∂q (r, q) = g(q). By integration we get I(r, q) = F (r) + G(q), where F is some function and G = g. By the path independence axiom IG-3, we get
Since (2.4) holds for any r, r ′ , F (r) + G(r) is constant, but it must be zero by axiom IG-5: F (r)+G(r) = I(r, r) = 0. Therefore
. Differentiating both sides with respect to q, we get tG ′ (tq) = G ′ (q). Multiplying both sides by q and letting x = tq, we get xG
Since I is increasing in q by axiom IG-2, we get k > 0. Clearly this function satisfies all axioms IG-1-IG-5.
From now on let us normalize the arbitrary constant k to 1, so the information gain is given by I(p, q) = log q p . This result, information gain = log posterior plausibility prior plausibility , is mathematically identical to [5, p. 4] , although Goldman takes this as the definition.
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In order to make plausible reasoning based on available information, consider the following desiderata.
I. Degrees of plausibility are represented by probabilities.
II. The robot always takes into account all of the evidence it has relevant to a question. It does not arbitrarily ignore some of the information, basing its conclusions only on what remains. In other words, the robot is completely nonideological.
III. Aristotelian logic: the robot assigns zero plausibility to propositions that contradict its knowledge.
IV. The robot always represents equivalent states of knowledge by equivalent plausibility assignments. That is, if in two problems the robot's state of knowledge is the same (except perhaps for the labeling of the propositions), then it must assign the same plausibilities in both.
V. Given prior plausibilities, the robot updates the plausibilities by minimizing the average information gain of the posterior plausibilities subject to known information. In other words, the robot is maximally conservative.
Desideratum I is stronger than Jaynes's desideratum J-I because I assume that the plausibility is a probability (i.e., finitely or countably additive measure). In particular, the plausibilities of mutually exclusive propositions are additive: if A, B are mutually exclusive propositions, then p(A ∨ B) = p(A) + p(B). Desideratum II is identical to J-IIIb. Desideratum III might be interpreted as a special case of II and probably needs no justification, but I need it nevertheless. Desideratum IV is identical to J-IIIc, Laplace's Principle of Indifference, which may or may not be necessary to prove subsequent theorems.
Desideratum V is the major difference from Jaynes's axioms. While Jaynes imposes "qualitative correspondence with common sense" (J-II), I impose that the robot is maximally conservative. This axiom makes sense, for if the robot radically updates the plausibilities (i.e., not sticking to its prior), then it should not have set up the particular prior plausibilities in the first place. To avoid unnecessary reference to axiom numbers, let us group the desiderata as follows: 3 In information theory the quantity − log p is known as the self-information, although I was unable to find a reference for its origin (Tribus [21] calls it surprisal ). Our information gain I(p, q) = log q p is the difference of the self-information of the prior and posterior. Kullback and Leibler [16] call log p 1 p 2 the information for discrimination, where p 1 , p 2 are general probabilities and not necessarily the prior and the posterior. The prior/posterior interpretation of p and q can also be clearly seen in [7, 8] .
I-III:
Weak Axioms of Plausible Reasoning I-IV:
Strong Axioms of Plausible Reasoning IG-1-IG-5 and V: Minimum Information Gain Principle
Implications of the Axioms
In this section I show that the new axioms imply Bayesian inference, maximum likelihood, maximum entropy principle, and minimum relative entropy principle.
Theorem 2. Weak plausibility and the minimum information gain principle imply the minimum relative entropy principle (the minimum discrimination information principle of Kullback [15, p. 37]).
Proof. Let { A i } be propositions that are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. Let p i = p(A i |I) be the prior plausibility of proposition A i given background information I, and q i = p(A i |I ′ ) be the posterior plausibility to be computed given the new information I ′ . By desideratum I, we have p i , q i ≥ 0 and p i = q i = 1. Since by Proposition 1 the information gain of A i is log qi pi , the ex post average information gain is
the relative entropy. 4 By desiderata II and V, the robot minimizes H(q; p) subject to all known information I ′ and the constraints q i ≥ 0, q i = 1, which is precisely the minimum relative entropy principle. [9] for setting up priors.
Corollary 3. Strong plausibility and the minimum information gain principle imply the maximum entropy principle of Jaynes
Proof. Desideratum IV is nothing but Laplace's Principle of Indifference. Hence, by desideratum I, the robot assigns the prior plausibility p(A i ) = 1 n . By Theorem 2 the robot computes the posterior plausibility p i = p(A i |I) by minimizing
(where we have invoked desideratum I: [19] . This is precisely Jaynes's maximum entropy principle [9] . I propose to define the Optimum Information Principle by the combination of the weak or strong plausibility and the minimum information gain principle, despite its implication is the well-known minimum relative entropy principle. There are two reasons to avoid the term "entropy". First, "entropy" is a misnomer both in physics (see [2] ) and in information theory. According to [22] , Shannon [19] named his measure of uncertainty or missing information "entropy" following the advice of von Neumann: " [It] has been used in statistical mechanics under that name . . . [and] no one knows what entropy really is, so in a debate you will always have the advantage." Clausius coined the word "entropy" after the Greek word for "transformation"; given that "entropy" is a misnomer, adding the adjective "relative" makes it only worse. Second, as a measure of information gain the Kullback-Leibler information H(q; p) is more fundamental than the Shannon entropy H(p) as shown by the above axiomatic derivation as well as the comparison of the two information measures provided in [8] : the Kullback-Leibler information, unlike the Shannon entropy, extends to arbitrary probability measures and it satisfies an additivity property. Since by desideratum V the quantity H(q; p) is the average information gain, and since Kullback and Leibler [16] call H(q; p) "information" before the term "relative entropy" was coined, the term Optimum Information Principle seems best. Proof. Let us first prove Bayes's rule. Suppose that the robot is given background information I and that the robot has prior plausibilities on the propositions A 1 , . . . , A n , B, and any logical conjunction or negation generated by them. Therefore the prior plausibilities of
c |I), etc., are well defined. The task of the robot is to update the plausibilities of { A i } when it is given additional information B. Since there are only a finite number of propositions, without loss of generality we may assume that { A i } are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. By desideratum I, we have
Let us denote the posterior plausibilities by q(A i ∩ B|B ∩ I), etc. In order to compute them, by Theorem 2 the robot solves
where p, q in (3.1a) take all possible forms of p(A i ∩ B|I), q(A i ∩ B|B ∩ I) and p(A i ∩B c |I), q(A i ∩B c |B∩I). Conditions (3.1b) and (3.1c) come from desiderata I and III: since ¬B (and hence A i ∧ (¬B)) is logically impossible knowing B, the robot assigns zero plausibility to A i ∧ (¬B). That we impose (3.1b) and (3.1c) and nothing else comes from using all relevant information as in desideratum II.
Since the function f (q) = q log q p is continuous and strictly convex and the constraints (3.1b), (3.1c) constitute a compact convex set, we can apply the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker theorem to solve (3.1). Let λ be the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to (3.1b). The Lagrangian is
where we have used the shorthand q i = q(A i ∩ B|B ∩ I) and p i = p(A i ∩ B|I).
The first-order condition, which is necessary and sufficient, reads
This shows that q i is proportional to p i , so by q i = 1 we obtain
where the first equality holds because q is a probability (desideratum I), the second equality holds because q(A i ∩ B c |B ∩ I) = 0 (desideratum III), and the last equality holds because p is a probability and { A i } are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. (3.2) 
the path independence. Therefore Jaynes's desideratum IIIa holds because if a conclusion can be reasoned out in more than one way, the path independence property (3.3) ensures that every possible way leads to the same result.
At this point I stress the distinction between our axiomatization and other author's. In his seminal work [19] , Shannon imposes as the third axiom "If a choice be broken down into two successive choices, the original H should be the weighted sum of the individual values of H", in which he implicitly uses Bayes's rule. The same remark applies to the axiomatization of the Kullback-Leibler information by Hobson [7] . Similarly, in the important axiomatization of the maximum entropy principle, Shore and Johnson [20] implicitly use Bayes's rule in their fourth axiom "Subset Independence: It should not matter whether one treats an independent subset of system states in terms of a separate conditional density or in terms of the full system density". Zellner [24] derives Bayes's rule from an "information processing rule", but it is not clear how it relates to maximum entropy and his definition of information seems somewhat arbitrary.
On the contrary, Cox [3] and Jaynes [12] derive the Bayes rule from intuitively appealing first principles, as we have done. In addition we have derived the maximum entropy principle and the minimum relative entropy principle.
Finally, let us show that the Optimum Information Principle implies maximum likelihood.
Theorem 5. The Optimum Information Principle implies the maximum likelihood principle of Fisher [4] . 7 Proof. Suppose that { X n } N n=1 are independently and identically distributed random variables with an unknown density f . Given the realizations { x n }, suppose that the statistician wishes to fit a parametric density f (x; θ) to f , where θ ∈ Θ is a parameter. Although prior and posterior distributions are meaningless for a frequentist, it is natural to interpret that the model f (x; θ) and the truth f correspond to the prior and posterior, respectively. Hence to make an optimal inference the statistician should choose θ so as to minimize the Kullback-Leibler information
However, by the law of large numbers we obtain H(f ; f θ ) = f log f − f log f θ = f log f − E f [log f (X; θ)]
log f (x n ; θ), so the statistician should maximize the log likelihood N n=1 log f (x n ; θ).
Concluding Remarks
The maximum entropy principle has occasionally been criticized ad hoc as "Why maximize entropy (or minimize relative entropy), why not other functions?". An inference method is valuable if and only if it is useful in analyzing real data, and therefore an inference method requires no interpretation, and no justification except practical usefulness. (Nevertheless the justification of the maximum entropy principle has been provided [9, 10, 11, 20] .) It is well-known that the minimum relative entropy principle (maximum entropy principle) and Bayesian inference are useful (see [18, 12] and the references therein). Therefore, since our Optimum Information Principle implies the minimum relative entropy principle, Bayes's rule, as well as maximum likelihood, it should be equally useful. In addition we have axiomatized plausible reasoning and derived the maximum entropy principle; hence we have answered the question "why maximize entropy?"
